The Question of Existence: Kant's Problematic View and Failure of Fregean Approach

    In his previously published article, the author of the present paper proves that Kant's approach to the question of existence has at least two problematic results called "the problem of contradiction" and "the problem of nonsense", by referring to Jeromy Shafer's analysis.  Based on the first problem, Kant's statements result in the fact that the predicate of "existence" is both real and unreal. Based on the second problem, Kant's view necessitates that either the subject of propositions has never exact external instance or no predication is real. This paper begins with explanation on these two problems. Then it elaborates on Edgar Moirsher and J. William Forgie's views called "Fregean approach". Based on the fact that "existence" is not a feature of things and as a second predicate it only predicates to concepts, these two philosophers try to solve aforementioned problems. The analysis and criticism of their views prove that their solutions which are said to be the best of their kind are not satisfactory and efficient.