EXPERIENCE AND JUDGEMENT § 8. THE HORIZON-STRUCTURE OF EXPERIENCE. THE TYPICAL PRECOGNITION OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL OBJECT OF EXPERIENCE

We present here a Russian translation of the 8th paragraph of Husserl's book “Experience and Judgment” (1939). The paragraph includes a systematic outline of the phenomenological conception of horizonedness, while in no other Husserl's book – from “Ideas I” to “Crisis” –we can find a fragment dealing with the idea of horizon elaborated so deep. The idea however is a substantial element of Husserl's conceptualization of experience as an open, indefinite process. In the 7th paragraph of “Experience and Judgment” the world is conceived as a universal “ground of certainty”, upon which all our experience is based, and in the 8th paragraph the intentional structure of experience (mostly as perception) is explicated. That structure is characterized as horizontal. The crucial difference here is between the “inner horizon” and the “outer horizon” of an object. The outer horizon stretches finally into the “world-horizon” – the ultimate, universal horizon comprising all partial horizons and perspectives. In its turn, typization functions here as a way of representation of objects laying beyond the field of what is given. Typization also covers latent aspects of present objects and concerns even their patent aspects. The most general type, according to Husserl, is “object as such” – a basic category of formal ontology. The idea of horizon has been a fundamental principle of classical phenomenology. Nowadays it provokes hot discussions among such authors as Jean-Luc Marion, Emmanuel Levinas, and Jacques Derrida. The discussions relate to the very essence of phenomenology. That's why we find publication of the fragment to be important.