HORIZON AND VISION. THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL IDEA OF EXPERIENCE VERSUS THE METAPHYSICS OF SIGHT

Can the nature of «vision» be captured by a metaphysics of sight or only by a phenomenological description of «seeing»? Furthermore, the relation between a metaphysics of sight and a Phenomenology of «seeing» can be presented in two different ways: a relation of continuity as well as of opposition. The first one takes necessarily the Phenomenology of «seeing» as only preparatory for the Metaphysics of sight as such. The second one affirms that we have to do with two opposite ways of questioning the nature of the prominent approach of mankind to the world, the theôrein. The aim of this paper is to show how this second way is possible if and only if we affirm that the Phenomenology of «seeing» is a method to keep away the problems and the paradoxes of the first way and of an a-critical acceptation of the metaphysics of sight. What provides to give to Phenomenology of «seeing» an anti-metaphysical commitment is the idea of horizon as transcendental structure of «seeing». Seeing as «experiencing» as well as «theorizing» became a contextual seeing, essentially related to a contextual situation. More generally, each appearance (phainomenon) consists of a whole system of appearances that are contentless but are also potential manifestations of the same type. The structure of possibility of horizon is a modal (not substantial) structure, denying any possible statement concerning the metaphysical nature of seeing or the possibility of a «metaphysical» seeing as such.