PRACTICAL INTENTIONALITY AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY AS A PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY

This paper deals with the problem of practical intentionality in the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl. Firstly, through the analysis of a passage found in “Logical Investigations”, the author will show Husserl's earlier position with respect to the problem of practical intentionality. He will then go on to critically assess this position and, with reference to some of Husserl's works written after the 1920's, prove that every intentionality should be regarded as practical intentionality. Correspondingly, transcendental phenomenology should also be characterized as practical philosophy. The author makes this statement with the following two senses in mind; transcendental phenomenology is practical philosophy, firstly, in the sense that it investigates various forms of practical intentionality and, secondly, in the sense that transcendental intentionality as the grounding source of transcendental phenomenology is also a kind of practical intentionality.