THE INTRINSIC REFLEXIVITY OF THE PHENOMENON AND THE AUTONOMY OF PHENOMENALIZATION: ON HOW RICHIR CARRIES OVER THE HUSSERLIAN PROJECT

Husserl was the first to clarify the specificity of the phenomenological realm. A phenomenon is an articulated whole whose intensity and richness are parallel to its purity. It is under the guidance of this coalescence that we re-examine the final clause of the Principle of principles («Ideen» I, § 24), often misinterpreted as a limitation of phenomenality. However, Richir's phenomenology of the nothing-but-phenomenon («rien que phenomena») remains faithful to the final clause of the Principle of principles in that it does not surpass the (nothing-but-) phenomenon in the name of any extra-phenomenological instance. Contrary to the apperceptions emerging from symbolic institution, the nothing-but-phenomenon takes place in the element of a concrete indeterminacy that phenomenalizes itself according to a reflexivity (intrinsic to the phenomenon) that develops itself all along an essentially transpassible phase of presence. Therefore, phenomenalization takes the form of a flickering (clignotement) that, in its final state, becomes autonomous and calls up subjectivity itself. Linked to the hyperbolic épochè, the vertigo of this autonomization outlines what Richir calls the beyond copernican turn (l'au-delà du renversement copernicien) leading thereby a non-standard phenomenology, which takes the form of an architectonic of the various levels of phenomenalization.