North Korean Nuclear Strategy: A Deterrence Quagmire for Korean Peninsula

Although North Korea has already tested nuclear weapons capability for four mes and plans to do more as it passes through the embryonic stages of its nuclear weapons development program, not much is known about North Korea's nuclear strategy. It is shrouded with greater ambiguity as ambiguity rules and plays a central role in its nuclear weapons program. In the absence of North Korea's policy document and instuonalizaon of its nuclear policy, it is not clear what nuclear strategy North Korea would opt for and why. Therefore, one expects many speculave interpretaons on the evolving nuclear strategy of North Korea. This arcle aempts to predict the conceptual essenals of minimum deterrence that North Korea would follow. But under the pretext of minimum deterrence it would have mulple opons to opt for one or more than one type of nuclear strategies. However, each of these nuclear strategies would have strategic implicaons for North Korea in general and the Korean peninsula in parcular. Conceptually, the essenals of minimum deterrence predict that if North Korea retains the modest number, curbs on more nuclear weapons tests, stays defensive and restrains from using Its deterrent forces, then this could be consistent with minimum deterrence perceived here. However, if North Korea, in its embryonic stages of deterrent force development, increases its deterrent forces, miniaturizes nuclear weapons, develops sophiscated delivery systems, acquires an assured second-strike capability (nuclear submarine) and appears to be more offensive, then this may not be consistent with what is conceptualized here as minimum deterrence. Apparently, as the arcle concludes, North Korea is in acve pursuit of the laer than the former and it might cross the essenal contours of minimum deterrence conceived here, which in turn would have dire security implicaons for the Korean Peninsula.