Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence Stability in South Asia

The objective and aim of the study is to explain the IndaUS concerns and arguments regarding Pakistani tactical nuclear weapons and how far these concerns are justified. This study seeks to analyze the fears of western and regional states against Pakistan's TNWs and will endeavor to find the ways in which Pakistani policy makers and opinion makers can best respond to these challenges. It will draw on both sides of the argument and conclude whether Pakistan has efficiently tackled the concerns raised by the international community or it has failed to achieve the status of a responsible nuclear weapon state. The research is descriptive, explanatory, and analytical in nature, as it tends to explain the concerns and apprehensions of western and regional powers on Pakistan's tactical nuclear weapons. The qualitative data collection method is used to gather information about the existing literature, important events, and reports. The research includes both primary and secondary data and has made use of a combination of content retrieved from journals, newspapers, interviews, and research articles. Pakistan's scientific and military establishment believed that acquisition of nuclear weapons would render India's conventional military superiority irrelevant. However, in less than a year, the 'irreversible accomplishment' was more or less reversed with the limited war in Kargil, Siachen. The aftermath of the military adventurism taught Pakistan Army the single most valuable lesson that would shape its policy in subsequent years: India's conventional superiority could very well assert itself within Pakistan's nuclear threshold. In order to tackle this, Pakistan decided to introduce a nuclear dimension to tactical warfare. The idea, as viewed by different analysts, is either absolutely genius or absolutely absurd. It has the potential to paralyze Indian Cold Start strategy as a deterrent or it has the potential to provoke a massive nuclear retaliation in the event of a limited war. While theoretically and historically evaluating the efficacy of Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) as a deterrent, the research paper has majorly found that Pakistan has no intension of using TNWs rather it is for deterrence purpose and for maintaining the strategic stability. Moreover, Pakistan has proved to be a responsible nuclear weapon state by inculcating changes within its security apparatus.