Ontological grounds for criticism of metaphysics and the return of metaphysiJournal: The Digital Scholar: Philosopher’s Lab (Vol.1, No. 2)
Publication Date: 2018-06-28
Authors : Olga E. Stolyarova;
Page : 106-120
Keywords : metaphysics; criticism of metaphysics; realism; skepticism; ontology; history of philosophy;
We affirm that today metaphysics returns to philosophy. This means there was a time without metaphysics, or at least its overcoming was considered a respectable position, a philosophical mainstream, otherwise it would be pointless to talk about its return. The denial of metaphysics does not mean, however, the absence of an ontology, but only the absence (at least in an explicit form) or the illegitimacy of a positive ontology, which makes judgments about over-sensible reality. The positive ontology is replaced by a negative (apophatic) ontology, which puts limits of thought, proving the impossibility of speculative thinking, and provides criticism of metaphysics. The criticism of metaphysics is an act and a fact of collective thought, and, as in the case of a reflection of a lonely skeptic, it reveals the ontological conditions for its own possibility. The discovery of these conditions is a truly philosophical task, since philosophy from the beginning claims itself that it moves from facts to the conditions of their possibility. Doubting the criticism of metaphysics for philosophy is tantamount to doubting the act (and fact) of its own thinking, which delineates the realm of the existing. Criticism of metaphysics that is considered as a philosophical fact brings skepticism to the ontological level. It allows us to talk about the return of metaphysics, which means the discovery of the ontological conditions of philosophical doubt as a fact. Dialectics of two philosophical traditions, positive ontology and negative ontology, provides a way to determine the phenomenon of the return of metaphysics as a legitimate response to criticism of metaphysics.
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