The epistemological glaucoma and psematical paradox (autological feature of truth and heterological feature of false)

In this paper is considered the main arguments of the deflationary concept of truth: the approaches of A. Tarski, W.V. Quine, H. Putnam and some others. Here are presented two representative examples of the elimination of truth as the value of the proposition: the concept of “languages games” by L. Witgenstein and “constructive empiricism” by B. van Fraassen. It is revealed that the statement “there are no true statements” is self-predictive and leads to absurdity. It is demonstrated that the elimination of “truth” from epistemology will require, with necessity, the elimination of “false” also. It is shown, that when we try to get answer on the question “Can a “false sentence”, understood as a “not true” sentence, i.e. р, has the same denotation on which it denotes (not be true)” a paradox arises, which calls “psematic” from the Greek word ψέματα (false). The essence of the paradox is that “every false sentence denotes false” denotes every false sentence denoting false, if and only if, “every false sentence denoting false” is not every true sentence denoting the truth. The result is: a) if “every false sentence denoting false” itself is not every true sentence denoting the truth, then, by the definition of “every false sentence denoting false”, it is not a sentence denoting false . And vice versa: b) If “every false sentence denoting false” itself is every true sentence denoting the truth, then, consequently, it is “every false sentence denoting false” and it is a sentence denoting false. In any case, it turns out that the proposition “false sentences denote false”, simultaneously have the sign that they designate and do not have it. It was found that “truth” has an autological nature, and “false” has heterological one.