The Role of Internal Factors in the 1953 Iranian Coup D'état

More than 66 years after the 1953 Iranian coup d'état, and the publication of numerous articles and books, the debate over this historic event and its aftermath by domestic and foreign researchers continues. Each of these sources and researchers has written and studied the story from their own point of view. The purpose of this article is to neutrally clarify the ambiguities of the 1953 Iranian coup d'état, to identify the causes of the Mosaddegh government's vulnerability to internal dissidents, and to examine the reasons for the absence of the people on the day of the coup. Based on this, we asked the question of “what role did the internal factors of the country play in Mosaddegh's failure and the achievement of the 1953 Iranian coup d'état?” In answer to this question, using a descriptive-analytical method based on the use of library resources, the hypothesis is as follows: it seems that the main designers of the coup (the United States and Britain) managed to evacuate the streets from people and Mosaddegh's supporters using the principle of surprise, internal influence in the army and among the leaders of the movement, and creating a street riot in the days leading up to the coup d'état using their mercenaries and their internal agents in Iran, and they achieved the victory by attacking government sensitive centers, Mosaddegh's house and finally the defeat of the movement.