DETERMINATION OF DANGEROUS ACTIONS OF OFFSHORE VESSEL OPERATORS DURING USE OF LASER-OPTICAL POSITIONING REFERENCE SYSTEM

Introduction. Current trends in the offshore industry are focused as much as possible on constantly improving the control of dangerous situations that may arise during any operations and reducing accidents and the consequences of accidents to a minimum in case of their occurrence. Over the past 15 years, it has been possible to significantly reduce accidents on offshore vessels by continuously improving the Dynamic Positioning system (DP), which made it possible to automatically hold the vessel at a given position for a long time, and perform various types of operations at a critically short distance to dangerous oil and gas complexes located on the high seas. The accuracy of maintaining the position of an offshore vessel is achieved using global and local reference positioning systems, relative to moving and stationary objects. Statistics for 2020 showed that the most attractive in terms of "price-quality" is the local reference positioning system, which works on the laseroptical principle, but the use of such a system also does not guarantee trouble-free, timely, if the operator of the ship's DP does not have much experience in using such systems and does not know where and under what conditions there may be a risk of loss position, and collision with the object of positioning. Between 2010 and 2020, 32% of accidents and dangerous situations occurred precisely because of operator errors when working with the laser-optical positioning reference system (LOPRS). Purpose. The purpose of the study is to identify dangerous actions of the crew of an offshore vessel that can lead to an emergency situation when using a laser-optical reference positioning system, using a modern method of theoretical analysis of system processes (TASP). Results. The paper proposes a method for analyzing the safety of using LOPRS, which works on the principle of reflection of laser beam from a reflector. With the help of TASP, the structure of the management organization was evaluated, the functional structure of the system management was modeled, safety requirements and restrictions were identified at the system level, causal scenarios for detailed determination of dangerous actions were considered, and the identified dangerous actions were analyzed. Conclusions. The peculiarity of the proposed TASP method is that, unlike traditional methods, TASP considers security as a management problem, and not a problem of component failure. TASP also includes both human system operators and gram components in the analysis, addressing both content and providing more information about their behavior relative to the electromechanical components of the system.