Avoiding selective jam attack by packet hiding method in wireless sensor network

the open nature of the wireless medium leaves it vulnerable to drive or wedge packets forcibly into a tight position referred as squeeze. This intentional interference with wireless transmissions can be used as a launch pad for mounting Denial-of-Service attacks on wireless networks typically; squeeze has been addressed under an external threat model. However, person with depth knowledge of internet protocol specications and network secrets can launch low-effort squeeze attacks that are difficult to detect and counter. In these attacks, the adversary is active only for a short period of time, selectively targeting messages of high importance. We illustrate the advantages of selective squeeze in terms of network performance degradation and adversary effort by presenting two case studies; a selective attack on TCP and one on routing. In this work, we address the problem of selective squeeze attacks in wireless networks. We show that selective squeeze attacks can be launched by performing real-time packet classication at the physical layer. To reduce these attacks, we develop three schemes that prevent real-time packet classication by combining cryptographic primitives with physical-layer attributes. We analyze the security of our methods and evaluate their computational and communication overhead