THE MONETARY STABILITY AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS*

Great inflation observed during the period 1965-1984 is the event final monetary (monetary climate the event) in the twentieth century (Meltzer, 2005). Three types of explanations have been developed - all highlighting the importance of monetary policy: ? Defects in the institutional and governance at origin sitting temporal incoherence (Barro ? Gordon model); ? Monetary policy errors committed in an unconscious: it would have been too lax, or because the authorities have overestimated potential output growth (Orphanides, 2003) or because there has been insufficient attention to anchor expected inflation (Clarida , Gali and Gertler, 1999); However, combined with a sharp drop in productivity undoubtedly led to accelerating inflation persistence (Collard and Dallas, 2007); ? Monetary policy errors committed in a conscious, namely the adoption by the authorities of a non-monetary approach to inflation; this is the result of an analysis of the experience of the United Kingdom and the United States (Nelson, 2005; DiCecio and Nelson, 2009). Inflation dynamics has seen a change in the early eighties, with the change that had profound monetary policy. After the Volcker experience, central bank reaction to inflation shocks became more aggressive. In this context, central banks have not hesitated to increase real interest rates to prevent triggering an inflationary spiral and the emergence of second round effects. For example, a sudden drop in inflation in the United States in the early eighties could be explained by EDF aggressive response to inflation shocks combined with lesser technological shocks (Carlström, and Paustian Fuerst, 2009).