Virtue Epistemologies and Epistemic Vice

While virtue epistemologists agree that knowledge consists in having beliefs appropriately formed in accordance with epistemic virtue, they disagree regarding what constitutes an epistemic virtue. Some take epistemic virtue to be a character trait. Others take epistemic virtues to be stable naturalistic dispositions which reliably produce true beliefs. There are also other virtue epistemologists who combine character traits and stable naturalistic dispositions into a “mixed” theory. All three focus exclusively on epistemic virtues, traits that lead cognizers to truth. But, the topic of epistemic vice is typically ignored. In this paper after arguing for the importance of accounting for epistemic vice, I consider dual systems theory, drawing a parallel with Ernest Sosa’s distinction between two kinds of knowledge. I argue that information supporting dual systems theory helps explain two different kinds of epistemic vice. After pointing out important advantages for including both kinds of vice in virtue epistemology and showing how virtue epistemologies can be modified to accommodate epistemic vice, I conclude by suggesting that consideration of epistemic vice favors mixed theories of virtue epistemology.