Anti- Reductionism and the Concept of Synthetic Judgment a Priori

The aim of this paper is to examine Kant’s claim of possibility of synthetic judgment a prior which is regarded as central to his critical Philosophy. These synthetic judgments a priori have special significance for the development of his philosophy in general and his philosophy of mathematics in particular. The most important and the useful varieties of human knowledge rely upon synthetic judgment a prior. Kant claimed that mathematics, as a science , consist of a body of synthetic judgments apriori. Such judgments are possible only because of the nature of human mind. The distinctions between analytic and synthetic propositions on the one hand, and apriori and aposteriori propositions on the other hand, are not new in philosophy. But the uniqueness of Kant lies on his emphasis and affirmation of synthetic judgment apriori, it is a novel invention of Kant in the history of philosophy. His views on epistemology centres around this concept. So the paper examines this issue from three perspectives- (1) Traditional views on the subject (ii) Kant’s own claim of its possibility and (iii) Contemporary reaction to this notion of synthetic judgment apriori.