Share Your Research, Maximize Your Social Impacts
THE MORAL HAZARD AS FORM OF THE INFORMATION ASYMMETRY: THE CONTINUOUS CASE
Journal: Academic Research International (Vol.2, No. 3)Publication Date: 2012-05-15
Authors : Tudor Colomeischi;
Page : 531-536
Keywords : moral hazard model; asymmetric information; Principal-Agent model; optimal contracts; effort level.;
Source : Download
Find it from : Google Scholar
Abstract
This paper draws up one of the most known form of information asymmetry manifestation, the moral hazard in the continuous case situation. General aspects regarding the informational asymmetry are emphasized here, the model hypotheses and the stages of running a contract between the Principal and the Agent, passing from the symmetrical information case towards the asymmetrical information.
Other Latest Articles
- ATTITUDES TOWARDS ACCENTED SPEECH AMONG RADIO DEEJAYS IN MALAYSIA
- EXPECTATIONS AND REALITIES: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FEMALE GENDER AND INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURES
- THE IMPACT OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE AND ADEQUATE SUPERVISION ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF INSTRUCTIONAL PROCESSES
- THE INFLUENCE OF INSTRUCTIONAL PROCESS AND SUPERVISION ON ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE OF SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTS OF RIVERS STATE, NIGERIA
- RE-INVENTING THE NIGERIAN EDUCATION SYSTEM FOR PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENTS
Last modified: 2013-09-03 01:06:07