Dynamic Detection of Packet Losses by CRDP

TCP has provided the primary means to transfer data reliably across the Internet, however TCP has imposed limitations on several applications. Measurement and estimation of packet loss characteristics are challenging due to the relatively rare occurrence and typically short duration of packet loss episodes. While active probe tools are commonly used to measure packet loss on end-toend paths, there has been little analysis of the accuracy of these tools or their impact on the network. The main objective is to understand the problem of detecting whether a compromised router is maliciously manipulating its stream of packets. In particular to this concern a simple yet effective attack in which a router selectively drops packets destined for some Victim. Unfortunately, it is quite challenging to attribute a missing packet to a malicious action because normal network congestion can produce the same effect. Modern networks routinely drop packets when the load temporarily exceeds their buffering capacities. Previous detection protocols have tried to address this problem with a user-defined- threshold: too many dropped packets imply malicious intent. However, this heuristic is fundamentally unsound; setting this threshold is, at best, an art and will certainly create unnecessary false positives or mask highly focused attacks.