TO THE CONCEPT OF «ALIENATION» IN HUSSERL AND HEGELJournal: Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology (Vol.4, No. 2)
Publication Date: 2015-06-25
Authors : Mikhail Belousov;
Page : 99-120
Keywords : Alienation; phenomenology; German Idealism; consciousness; difference; I; оther.;
The article deals with alienation as a difference between subjectivity and itself. Based on the comparative analysis of the concept in Phenomenology of Spirit and The Crisis of European Sciences the study treats the difference as a presupposition underlying both phenomenology and German Idealism and reveals its heuristicity. The first section explicates the conceptual horizon of the alienation problem in Phenomenology of Spirit. It is the interpretation of Kantian concept of selfconsciousness in German Idealism. The article analyzes two aspects of the concept motivating the interpretation: self-consciousness as a spontaneous act and both as the condition and result of the synthesis. The second section demonstrates the correlation between these aspects and two dimensions of alienation in Phenomenology of Spirit: the self-assertion of the subject as object, i.e. as other for itself, and transition from the subject to a predicate, also treated as the self-assertion of the one (subject) as other (predicate). So the research shows that Hegel identifies actuality of the subject with becoming itself as becoming other for itself. In its completeness it appears to be suspended (not eliminated) alienation. The last section is devoted to alienation as the constitution of another ego in Crisis and compares Husserlian and Hegelian understanding of the phenomenon. Unlike Hegel, Husserl discovers irreversibility of alienation, as the difference between ego and alter ego is not the one between ego and itself. Yet the concepts of the primal I (Ur-Ich) and temporalization as the difference of the I from itself suggest that the difference between ego and alter ego is grounded in the one of the I from itself. The heuristicity of the grounding is the suspension of the adequate evidence principle. The difference of ego from itself in intersubjective and temporal experience as the fundamental difference is constituted insofar as immediate perception is slipping away.
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