THE SENSE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IN KANT AND IN HUSSERL

Unlike Kant's practical philosophy and aesthetics that still enjoy a wide popularity, two Kantian topics that belong to his transcendental philosophy have become favourite targets of manifold attacks as out-dated and archaic, especially during the 20th century: the concept of the “transcendental” and the role of the “I think”. Yet, a century and a half later Husserl salvaged both of these concepts in their essential core, and – against the tide of his time – dealt with them anew, for he considered them revolutionary and unprecedented in history. Husserl's phenomenological method profoundly differed from Kant's constructive methodology – albeit his transcendental turn was also inspired by it – enabling him to overcome many of the controversial aspects of Kant's interpretation. Thanks to Husserl's retrieval, both concepts survived the implacable judgment of history and are currently being seriously reconsidered, in ever increasing measure, as relevant for philosophy. Although both topics are intertwined and should be dealt with jointly, this article is only concerned with some aspects that are central to the “meaning of the transcendental”. First, as it has been introduced by Kant, and second, as it has been retrieved by Husserl in its essential core, broadening its reach far beyond the merely “speculative” or “theoretical” level to which Kant confines it, in order to encompass the whole field of lived human experiences (theoretical, practical, or evaluative), as well as in cultural and scientific endeavours.