Nuclear Issues, Escalation Control and Stability-Instability Paradox

Nuclear weapons have the capability of maintaining stable relations between nuclear neighbors at strategic level but at the same time prove disappointing at the lower edge of spectrum. This speculation is called 'stability-instability paradox'. This paper investigates the extent to which the theory is applicable in lndo-Pak relations. By drowing a comparison between pre and post nuclear crises between India and Pakistan, the study analyses that post-nucleorized South Asia hos been characterized by a number of crises and near crises situations, but the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons hos toned down the fragile environment. Further, stability at conventional level is being threatened by some aspirant Indian moves, like Bol/istic Missile Defense. The study concludes that new strategic developments by Indio demands o quantitative and qualitative up-grodotion of Pakistan's nuclear weapons and delivery system, survivable command and control system, reliable early warning system ond o change of its nuclear posture. The study postulates that if the balance of terror tilted in Indian favor, the prevalent stobility-instobility paradox will turn Into o total instability.