SOME ISSUES OF THE MENS REA OF THE PROVOCATION OF A CRIME IN THE CRIMINAL LAW OF GEORGIA

The article will consider the issues of the mens rea of the provocation of a crime. In particular, in what form of intent it is possible to commit a provocation of a crime, what subjective attitude a provocateur may have to a provoked offense, and also to what extent a provoked offense can be imputed to a provocateur and in what form of mens rea (intention or negligence) he/she can act on in relation to the provoked offence. How at such a moment should the actions of a provocateur be qualified — as cumulative crimes or only as a provocation of a crime? This question is especially interesting in the case of direct intent on the part of the provocateur to complete the provoked offense. If an action can be regarded as cumulative crimes, then in this case the provocateur acts as a principal or accomplice? These issues are debatable in the theory of criminal law of Georgia, so it will be interesting to dwell on them.