Curzon's Ultimatum and Its Impact on the USSR Policy Towards Poland

The author raises the issue that was practically unexplored on the impact of the British ultimatum delivered to the USSR in May 1923 on the relations between Moscow and Warsaw. The author cites new documents from the diplomatic correspondence of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs' central office (NKID) with the Polish embassy which show that the uproar caused by the Curzon memorandum in the Soviet leadership extended far beyond the sphere of Soviet-British relations. There are analyzed the concessions that Moscow was ready to make in order to prevent Poland from joining the new anti-Soviet front. The comparative-historical analysis is used to examine the dynamics of changes in the nature and scale of these concessions depending on the tension in Soviet-British relations. The conclusion is made that the Curzon memorandum provoked a turn in the Soviet policy towards Poland which Moscow did not fully abandon even when the fears of forming a new anti-Soviet coalition were dispelled. The article also substantiates the reasons why the Soviet leadership decided not to give up its readiness to make a number of concessions to Poland, despite the fact that in June 1923 there was no threat of a new anti-Soviet intervention and Warsaw's participation in it.