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INEFFICIENCY IN HEALTH CARE: MORAL HAZARD IN TERMS OF MANDATORY HEALTH INSURANCE (CASE OF BULGARIA)

Journal: Journal Association 1901 SEPIKE (Vol.1, No. 19)

Publication Date:

Authors : ;

Page : 250-254

Keywords : asymmetric information; principal-agent model; moral hazard; over hospitalization; inefficiency in health care;

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Abstract

Moral hazard generally is being presented as phenomena of private insurance system. There are indicators, which reveal moral hazard also in system of compulsory health insurance. From the side of patients, there is excess demand, especially for hospital treatment. From the side of doctors, exist "supplier induced demand". As a result, excess demand and supply create more health spending and inefficiency in health treatment. The problem has been derived from the practice of Bulgaria. It testifies that moral hazard is also phenomena for the mandatory health insurance system.

Last modified: 2018-04-23 20:59:01