THE EFFECTS OF THE DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM ON BANK RISK

Bank stability is based on the depositors' trust in banks and the entire banking systems. One of the basic measures that provides these is the deposit insurance system as an integral part of the security network of each financial system. Its importance is particularly pronounced in times of instability and crisis, while in “good times” their positive effects are underestimated. Nevertheless, the deposit insurance system has also resulted in negative consequences in terms of bank risk mitigation, reduced market discipline, moral hazard risk, negative selection and principal-agent problems. The aim of the paper is to examine the effects of the deposit insurance system on bank stability in the pre-global financial crisis period, the crisis period and the post-global financial crisis period. The bank stability is approximated by measures of bank risk (z-score, non-performing loans in total loans) and deposit volatility (total deposits and interest expense of deposits). The research has included all types of credit institutions (1453) of the EU states and some selected SE European countries. The analysis has been verified by dynamic panel data analysis - GMM Arellano-Bond (AB) estimator in two steps. The empirical analysis results indicate that the effect of the deposit insurance system on banking stability, measured by bank risks and deposit volatility, depends on the system characteristics, i.e. the applied system design, in view of institutional, historical and legal differences among countries.