IMPACT OF SYBIL ATTACK ON SECURE GEOGRAPHIC FORWARDING APPROACHES

The location-based or geo-routing forwarding approaches have been massively adopted for information delivery in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). This is as a result of the rise in emergent technologies such as the internet of things (IoT) and Cyber-physical systems (CPS). However, this rise is hindered by the need for security. The security mechanisms mostly installed to thwart threats in the network (WSN) tend to either provide security at the expense of performance or vice versa. In this paper, we study the impact of Sybil attack on three secure geo-routing approaches (Dynamic Window Secure Implicit Geographic Forwarding (DWSIGF), Fuzzy Geographic Forwarding (FuGeF) and Trust-based Fuzzy Implicit Cross-layer protocol (TruFiX)) that employ the non-traditional security mechanisms to provide minimal security, while maintaining performance (sensor constrained resources). The protocols (DWSIGF, FuGeF and TruFiX), basically utilize alterations in the normal routing semantics, sampling using computational intelligent systems and trust. Using extensive simulation experiments, the protocols were tested against each other and the result shows TruFiX outperforms both FuGeF and DWSIGF in terms of packet delivery ratio in a network threatened by Sybil attack.