An Evolutionary Game Study of Recycling Strategies for Used Cell Phones Under Government Intervention

Mobile phones are fast changing and highly popularized, with high carbon emissions, and have both economic and environmental attributes. Increasing the amount of used cell phones recycled and recycling them effectively has become an urgent challenge to be solved. In order to explore the strategic choices of each participant involved in recycling, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of local government, recycling enterprises and consumers, analyzes the stability of the strategic choices of each game subject, and further analyzes the stability of the equilibrium point in the tripartite game system using Jacobi matrix. Finally, simulation analysis is carried out to discuss the influence of key parameters on the evolution of the participants behavior. The results of the study show that 1 the implementation of government subsidies can incentivize enterprises to increase the rate of active recycling, but there is an upper limit to the subsidies, otherwise the government will take a non regulatory strategy 2 the probability of the government to achieve the strength of the penalty directly affects the strategic choice of recycling enterprises, when the penalty coefficient is less than 0.5,recycling enterprises for the governments penalties are not sensitive to continue to maintain the initial strategic choice 3 recycling enterprises to increase the probability of the The probability of consumer subsidies can motivate consumers to participate in recycling, with the increase of subsidy incentives to increase the probability of active participation in the choice of consumers also increased, but the subsidy incentive can not exceed 12 this queer value, otherwise the enterprise will choose a negative recycling strategy 4 consumers themselves on the users privacy concerns are higher, recycling enterprises and consumers will be positive recycling and active participation in the direction of the evolution of the government can take a non regulatory strategy. can adopt a non regulatory strategy. Jianfen Zhou "An Evolutionary Game Study of Recycling Strategies for Used Cell Phones Under Government Intervention" Published in International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (ijtsrd), ISSN: 2456-6470, Volume-7 | Issue-6 , December 2023, URL: https://www.ijtsrd.com/papers/ijtsrd61290.pdf Paper Url: https://www.ijtsrd.com/management/other/61290/an-evolutionary-game-study-of-recycling-strategies-for-used-cell-phones-under-government-intervention/jianfen-zhou