A DENIAL OF SERVICE STRATEGY TO ORCHESTRATE STEALTHY ATTACK PATTERNS IN CLOUD COMPUTING

The triumph of the cloud computing archetype is owing to its on-demand, self-service, and pay-by-use nature. The possessions of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks engross not only the quality of the delivered service, but also the service continuance costs in terms of reserve utilization. Explicitly, the longer the detection delay is, the elevated the costs to be incurred. Consequently, a fastidious consideration has to be paid for stealthy DoS attacks. They aim at minimizing their visibility, and are sophisticated attacks adapted to influence the worst-case recital of the target system through definite periodic, pulsing, and low-rate traffic patterns. A strategy to orchestrate stealthy attack patterns, which reveal a slowly-increasing-intensity inclination premeditated to impose the utmost financial cost to the cloud Customer has been proposed, while relating to the job size and the service advent rate obligatory by the detection mechanisms. It is described both how to apply the proposed strategy, and its effects on the target system deployed in the cloud.