SPECULATIVE REASONING IN E. FINK’S MEONTIC PHENOMENOLOGY

This study deals with the role a language plays in the phenomenologizing, focusing on the problem of the phenomenological language posed by E. Fink. The function of a language cannot be reduced to expressing the achievements of phenomenologizing. It gives appearance of transcendental realm both as the “illusion” and the “semblance”. The problem of the phenomenological language matters for the theory of phenomenological method as such: E. Fink emphasizes the meontic nature of transcendental realm in the 6th Cartesian Meditation. Though, in order to describe this realm phenomenologists have to use natural language, preformed within the natural attitude. The new way of description is required in order to prevent phenomenology from being “mundanized”: allowing the transcendental realm to appear and yet maintaining its particular ontological characteristic. It may be achieved through the metaphor-based speculative projection (Entwurf). This study considers the relevant correlation between Fink's theory of the method and classical German philosophy: it juxtaposes Kant's transcendental dialectics and the doctrine of the method with Fink's “transcendental theory of the method” and Hegel's Absolute spirit with Fink's concept of Absolute. The ambiguous and vague natural word, that may be redefined, has a productive capacity for being used in the speculative projection. The right way of description transforms it into a speculative concept, which both raises a problem and maintains its problematic nature. The speculative projection provokes philosophical astonishment and requires readers to get into phenomenologizing.