Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: Failing or Not?

In South Asia nuclear deterrence is failing or not How far the nuclear deterrence is able to stop wars in South Asia Scholars have different arguments upon the aforementioned queries, principally divided into two blocs’ i. e. nuclear pessimist and nuclear optimist. Nuclear optimists stated that nuclear weapons can bring balance in South Asia whereas nuclear pessimists affirmed that nuclear weapons can only bring tension and arms race in South Asia. Different pieces of literature desired to come to a solution through empirical tests, in this paper we aspired to focus on both scholarly literature and empirical tests and draw a conclusion. Through Scott Sagan’s models of building nuclear weapons we tried to find out the reasons for India and Pakistan to build nuclear weapons. Despite other reasons security concern is the principal reason to build nuclear weapons by the states that bestow security-insecurity dilemma in South Asia instigating arms race. It is plausible to argue, though despite multiple conflicts and border skirmishes these two countries still have not used conventional military and nuclear weapons against each other, which supports the idea that the state is not an irrational actor rather they can act rationally. Though the chances of accidental war and problems posed by the non-state actors, India and Pakistan aspire to avoid nuclear and conventional war and pursue the way of a diplomatic solution. The article draws a conclusion that nuclear power is not capable to stop all the wars but it can provide a balance and discourage states to engage in a nuclear war or conventional war and opt for a diplomatic solution. This article contributes to understanding the reasons for India-Pakistan to achieve nuclear weapons, how far nuclear deterrence is successful in South Asia, through giving scholarly as well as empirical foundation.