THE ETHICAL VALUE JUDGEMENTS ARE NONSENSE: WITTGENSTEIN’S APPROACH

The purpose of this paper is to maintain the vie w through analysis that the ethical value judgments are nonsense. The paper is about what might be called the Philosophical tradition of ethics and Wittgenstein opposition to that tradition. My purpose is to elucidate how this conception of ethical judgmen ts is in itself a sufficient reason for regarding them as nonsense. Wittgenstein claim in the ‘Tractatus Logico - Philosophicus’ that there can be no ethical propositions. Wittgenstein thought that ethical value judgments are absolute in the sense that their correctness. They does not depend at all on how things are in the world. Absolute judgment of value cannot be rational or irrational, reasonable or unreasonable. The argument behind this concept is that the value is not arbitrary or accidental. In order t o support that interpretation, I consider passages from the 1929 lecture on ethics. This read us to a reappraisal of the relevance of the Tractarian project of showing that ethical sentences cannot make sense.