Formulating Operating System Anonymization by Monolithic Keyring Subsystem Fabrication

The monolithic kernel is a widely used kernel when building ARM architectures and Linux distributions. With all instructions being in the kernel space, it is insecure, and can easily perform cross-transactions of sensitive information when under a memory leak, thus, it is vital to lock certain sections of the kernel to confine it from exposing personal information to risk. Investigation: This paper demonstrates a Volatile Operating System formulated by the authors with the use of Keyring Subsystems for fragmenting the kernel space into multiple domes using security keys. Method: A kernel is configured and built using security modules, and deployed with anonymization tools to a bootable USB, to check if memory leaks leave traces of cache into the device drivers or the disk. These anonymization tools help to clear memory. Principle Result: Less to no information was transmitted to the device memory, leaving everything as is. The anonymization tools cleared off all the events and cache before shutting down the system, making it challenging for forensics to acknowledge the use of a volatile OS into the device from a USB stick.