The Tiebout model in the Russian Federation

In recent decades, there have been clear global tendencies towards decentralization, and rapid growth in the autonomy and responsibilities of subnational governments. As a result of decentralization, a large variety of systems emerged, with different degrees of fiscal, administrative, and political powers given to subnational governments. But what are the arguments for decentralization? Do these arguments work in all systems and circumstances? In Tiebout's approach, different local governments suggest different tax-expenditure bundles and mobile citizens, the consumer-voters, are supposed to allocate themselves in accordance with their preferences. The Tiebout model is very influential in the contemporary public finance field, however, surprisingly, there have only been a few direct tests of this theory. This paper is devoted to the direct examination of the Tiebout model in the case of the Bayandai district (Irkutskaya oblast, Russia).