A RELAÇÃO ENTRE DIREITO E MORAL: UMA DISCUSSÃO SOBRE A MORALIDADE EM FERRAJOLI E DWORKIN

Ferrajoli and Dworkin are authors who in the search for the protection of individual rights seek to formulate theories that discuss and try to avoid decisionism. The authors' epistemology, however, differs when Ferrajoli's assertion assumes his positivist bias, that is, a semantic theory along the lines of those criticized by Dworkin. In view of the similarity of the authors' objectives, this article seeks to analyze if there is a possibility of approximation between the theoretical constructions regarding the relation between law and morals. Throughout the investigation, through the analysis of the authors 'and critics' bibliography, it will be shown that the moral rejected by Ferrajoli is not the same accepted by Dworkin and that, therefore, the discourses of both are not so distant