DUTIES TOWARDS NON-RATIONAL ANIMALS: A KANTIAN UNDERSTANDING

The paper makes an effort to show whether Kant's ethics is appropriate to deal with our moral obligations towards non-rational animals. Ethical view of Kant is based on the dignity of humanity as its sole fundamental value. Rational beings are intrinsically valuable because they are endowed with rationality, freedom and have the capacity to set their own ends. With regards to non-rational animals we have an only indirect duty. For him humans have no direct duties with regards to non-rational beings because they lack both rationality and autonomy. Kant rejection of direct duty to nonrational beings is the reason why many environmental ethicist and animals rights do not favor his approach. They considered Kant version of indirect duty theory is based on human-centered. However, some of the Kantian has tried to replace Kant's indirect duty theory to direct duties by using Kant theory. They offer a strong argument to replace the indirect duty theory of Kant but their interpretations do not fit well with Kant's view. Therefore, in this paper, despite the problems with indirect duty theory, I will try to show how Kant's concept of duties regarding non-rational animals represents much more sophisticated than the Kantian had maintained.